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In Bernard Williams’s famous story, Jim must choose whether to shoot an 
innocent hostage. If he does not, Pedro will shoot that person plus nineteen more. 
If Jim does shoot, Pedro will release the other nineteen hostages. Jim must decide 
whether to do something terrible. If he does not, these innocent people will bear 
an enormous cost.1 
 The main point of Williams’s discussion is not about whether Jim should 
shoot—he allows that, perhaps, he should—but instead about what Jim’s reasons 
are. Williams supposes that, whatever the verdict about what Jim should do, Jim 
certainly has a strong reason not to shoot. This, he thinks, is sufficient to show 
that Act Utilitarianism is strongly counter-intuitive, since Act Utilitarianism 
apparently cannot account for this reason. 
 Suppose that Williams is right that Jim has a strong reason not to shoot. 
Let us add, as seems undeniable, that Jim has a strong reason to shoot—since 
doing so would save nineteen innocent lives.2 Let us also shelve the question of 
what Jim should do, all things considered. Which sort of ethical theory seems 
best placed to explain the existence of these countervailing reasons? 
 This question is importantly broader than the one that Williams and most 
of his commentators went on to discuss. Their question was about how to 
account for Jim’s strong reason not to shoot—whether in terms of integrity, or 
agent-relativity, for example, or something else. The broader question is how best 
to account for both of Jim’s reasons: to shoot, and not to shoot. Ideally, we would 
like a satisfying ethical theory to explain the strong conviction that there are 
conflicting reasons in cases such as this. These are cases in which failing to do the 
thing that we are certain is morally wrong in ordinary cases has a very high cost. 
A theory which explains one of Jim’s reasons without explaining the other 
                                                
* I am grateful to Stephen Barker, David Beesley, Gregory Currie, Guy Fletcher, the late Susan 
Hurley, Mark Jago, Gregory Mason, Douglas Portmore, and members of an audience at the 
University of Nottingham for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. © 
Christopher Woodard 
1 See Williams (1973: 98-100). 
2 For simplicity, assume that any shooting will certainly kill the victim. 
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would, I take it, be inferior to another which explained both of Jim’s reasons, 
other things equal. 
 In this paper I’ll contrast two broad approaches to explaining conflicting 
reasons in cases like this. One, which has received most attention in recent years, 
focuses on the agent faced with the dilemma, who I’ll call the actor. For example, 
this approach focuses on Jim. Advocates of it usually hope to find a reason not to 
shoot in his integrity, or his special relationship to his own actions, or his 
distinctive point of view on the world. According to this sort of view, we might 
say, Act Utilitarianism goes wrong by failing to recognise the full significance of 
Jim’s agency. 
 I’ll favour a different approach. This focuses on the agent who sets up the 
dilemma: the one who creates the obstacle that forces the actor to choose between 
what seems right and what seems good. I’ll call this individual the other agent. For 
example, this approach focuses on Pedro. According to this sort of view, Act 
Utilitarianism goes wrong by failing to pay due attention to what Pedro could do, 
as contrasted with what he will or would do. It fails to recognise the full 
significance of Pedro’s agency. 
 I’ll begin by outlining the two different approaches. Then I’ll explain the 
attractions of claiming that Jim’s reasons depend on facts about what Pedro could 
do. Of course, other approaches are possible. Hence, my conclusion is only 
comparative: the analysis of Jim’s reasons in terms of what Pedro could do is at 
least as promising as the dominant approach, which analyses Jim’s reasons in 
terms of the special importance of what Jim does. 
 
 
1. What Jim does 
 
Most responses to Williams’s story assume that it suggests that Act Utilitarianism 
goes wrong by failing to appreciate the special importance of some feature of 
Jim’s agency. Williams himself drew this conclusion from the story. Having just 
introduced Jim, Williams outlines his diagnosis of the faults of Act Utilitarianism 
as follows: 
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A feature of utilitarianism is that it cuts out a kind of consideration which for some 
others makes a difference to what they feel about such cases: a consideration involving 
the idea, as we might first and very simply put it, that each of us is specially responsible 
for what he does, rather than for what other people do.3 
 
Famously, Williams goes on to develop this idea through a discussion of 
integrity, alleging that Act Utilitarianism is committed to an incoherent picture of 
the relationship between an agent’s ‘projects and his actions’.4 
 However, let’s abstract from the details of the subsequent discussion, and 
concentrate instead on the underlying simple idea.5 Williams is right that a 
tempting reaction to the case of Jim, and others like it, is that Act Utilitarianism 
fails to give due weight to the special responsibility each agent has for her own 
actions. In particular, this is a tempting diagnosis of its failure to explain Jim’s 
strong reason not to shoot. According to the Act Utilitarian, Jim has no reason 
not to shoot, since his reasons depend only on the consequences for utility of his 
options in the case at hand. These consequences are as follows: if he shoots, one 
innocent person will die; if he does not shoot, that innocent person will still be 
shot, and so will another nineteen. Jim has no other options, and there is no 
uncertainty about these consequences.6 However, this bald reckoning seems to 
ignore a crucial feature of the situation. If Jim shoots, he has killed one innocent 
person himself; while if he does not, it will be Pedro who kills the twenty. Though 
these twenty deaths will be a sure consequence of Jim’s refusal, they still will not 
be something that he does. Since he has a special responsibility for what he does, 
he has a strong reason not to shoot that Act Utilitarianism does not recognise. 
 At risk of some oversimplification, I will say that diagnoses of this sort—
those resting on the idea that what Act Utilitarianism misses in cases like this is 
the special responsibility of each agent for her own actions—focus attention on 
what the actor does. In Jim’s case, they focus attention on what Jim does. The idea 
                                                
3 Williams (1973: 99), emphasis in the original. 
4 Williams (1973: 100-118). The quoted phrase appears on p. 100. 
5 For discussion of Williams’s claims about integrity, see for example Hollis (1983) and Scheffler 
(1982: Chapter One). 
6 Williams’s story is slightly more complex, in two main ways. First, there are three agents: Jim, 
Pedro, and the captain (Pedro’s boss). Second, he allows Jim a third option, of trying to 
overpower Pedro and the captain, the certain result of which would be the death of all twenty 
hostages plus Jim. I will ignore these features of the case, since they do not bear on the issues at 
stake here. 
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is that paying attention to the nature of what he does brings to light important 
ethical considerations that Act Utilitarianism misses. This risks oversimplification 
because we can cash out the idea of special responsibility for one’s own actions in 
different ways. For example, we can cash it out in terms of the distinction 
between doing and allowing, or instead in terms of the distinction between 
intending and foreseeing. Both of these distinctions are, from an abstract point of 
view, versions of the same idea, of attaching special importance to the actor’s 
own actions; but, of course, there are other very important differences between 
these different versions of that idea. 
 Some version of the idea that agents are specially responsible for their own 
actions seems embedded in the idea of agent-relative constraints.7 Such 
constraints specify certain kinds of action, and rule out one kind of putative 
justification for performing acts of these kinds: namely, that doing so is necessary 
and sufficient to prevent a greater number of acts of the very same kind. For 
example, we might claim that there is an agent-relative constraint against killing 
the innocent. This implies that it would not be right for Jim to shoot one innocent 
person just because doing so is necessary and sufficient (in the circumstances) to 
prevent Pedro killing that person plus another nineteen. Such a constraint 
presupposes that we distinguish between what Jim does and the total effects of his 
actions, for the latter would include Pedro’s shootings were Jim to refuse to 
shoot. So, the idea of such a constraint relies on some such distinction between 
what agents do and what happens as a result of what they do.8 This illustrates just 
one way we might rely on the idea of special responsibility in thinking about 
cases like Jim’s. 
 Samuel Scheffler has argued recently that, whether we believe in agent-
relative constraints or not, we can’t avoid attributing basic ethical significance to 
some version of the idea that agents are specially responsible for what they do.9 
Moreover, he makes some intriguing remarks that seem to suggest that some 
                                                
7 See Kagan (1989: 24-32; Chapters 3-4). 
8 Agent-relative constraints needn’t rely on the distinction between doing and allowing in 
particular; they could, for example, rely on the distinction between intended and merely foreseen 
consequences of actions. The point is simply that some such distinction—in a broad sense 
between what the actor is and is not specially responsible for, to use Williams’s phrase—is 
necessary for the idea of an agent-relative constraint. See Kagan (1989: Chapters 3-4). 
9 Scheffler (2004). 
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version of this idea enables us to strike a balance between two views of ourselves. 
For example, he writes: 
 
. . .  one of the functions of norms that rely on the distinction between doing and 
allowing is to regulate the effectively ineliminable tension between the special 
importance we attach to our own actions, and our recognition that those actions are 
nevertheless subsumed within the larger causal web.10 
 
One way of interpreting this claim is as follows. In placing special emphasis on 
what agents do, norms that distinguish between doing and allowing give due 
weight to our view of ourselves as responsible agents. On the other hand, in 
nevertheless taking some account of what agents allow, these norms give due 
weight to our view of ourselves as mere parts of the ‘causal web’. Moreover, we 
can reflect our considered views about the relative importance of these two 
aspects of agents in the norms themselves, by adjusting the extra weight given in 
those norms to what agents do over what they allow. In this way, we rely on 
these norms to strike an appropriate balance between these two views of 
ourselves—as Scheffler puts it, to ‘regulate the effectively ineliminable tension’ 
between these two ways of thinking of agents. 
 Does Scheffler’s remark offer the key to explaining both of Jim’s reasons? 
We might hope so, since we might expect that his reason to shoot is associated 
with the view of him as part of the causal web, while his reason to not shoot is 
associated with the view of him as a responsible agent. However, there are some 
well-known and serious problems with this way of analysing such cases. Briefly, 
they are as follows. 
 The first is to explain how to distinguish between what the agent is and is 
not specially responsible for—between, for example, what he does and what he 
allows, or between what he intends and what he merely foresees. In some hard 
cases it is very difficult to draw these distinctions.11 Second, there is a problem in 
showing why such distinctions, once drawn, are ethically significant—except by 
                                                
10 Scheffler (2004: 225). Similarly, he says (2004: 239): ‘part of the function of norms that 
distinguish between doing and allowing is to strike a balance between considerations of two very 
different kinds: between the inevitable priority and distinctiveness of action, on the one hand, and 
its unavoidable subsumption within a larger causal web, on the other’. 
11 For discussion of these difficulties, see for example Quinn (1989); Kamm (1992); Bennett (1995: 
Chapters 4-11); Williams (1995). 
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appeal to those intuitions we wish to explain in light of one of these distinctions. 
If that is the most we can say for them, though, we cannot explain these intuitions 
in terms of either distinction. At best, the distinctions would help us to summarise 
the convictions. To use them to explain the convictions, we would need some 
independent rationale for attributing significance to one or both distinctions.12 
 Third, there is what we can call Kagan’s question: suppose that we have 
reason to believe that the distinction between doing and allowing (say) has basic 
ethical significance; why think it has different significance as applied to the 
actor’s actions than as applied to other agents’ actions? Suppose, for example, 
that we employ this distinction in thinking about Jim’s case. Why think that what 
Jim does is more important for Jim’s reasons than what Jim allows, but not that 
what Pedro does is more important for Jim’s reasons than what Pedro allows? On 
the face of it, applying the distinction to all relevant agents will undermine the 
attempt to explain common convictions in cases like this; but as Kagan argues, 
there is no clear rationale for applying it to some but not all relevant agents.13 
 One further problem is that, contrary to what Scheffler seems to suggest, 
we cannot explain the conflict in Jim’s reasons merely by appeal to some suitably 
drawn distinction between what he is and is not specially responsible for. For 
example, appeal to the distinction between doing and allowing doesn’t suffice to 
explain this conflict. Suppose we think that what is done is twice as important as 
what is allowed. In considering Jim’s reasons we then discount the deaths Pedro 
would bring about were Jim to refuse to shoot by a factor of two, as compared 
with the death Jim would bring about were he to shoot. Still we have the 
conclusion that Jim has a strong reason to shoot, and no reason not to do so. 
Now suppose that we discount what is merely allowed by a greater factor, 
sufficient to overturn this judgement about Jim’s case (we might say, for example, 
that what is done is one hundred times more important than what is allowed). 
Then we would have to conclude that Jim has a strong reason not to shoot, and 
no reason to shoot. In short, however we balance the significance of doing and 
allowing, no simple appeal to the distinction can explain what we set out to 
explain, which is the conflict in Jim’s reasons. 
                                                
12 Kagan makes this point very forcefully (1989: 114-121). 
13 See Kagan (1989: 125-126). 
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 Perhaps this last problem is not very severe. After all, it might be objected, 
this merely shows that a satisfying ethical view would have to contain other 
components. Admittedly, it is worth pointing out that ‘norms that rely on the 
distinction between doing and allowing’ don’t suffice to explain the conflict of 
reasons in Jim’s case and others like it. But it may still be true that they play an 
important or even essential role in a larger story which does explain such 
conflicts. 
 Consider, then, one final problem for approaches which focus on what the 
actor does. Given their focus, such approaches seem insensitive to the issue of 
whether an agent or a non-agent causes (or constitutes) the obstacle facing the 
actor; yet, our intuitions seem sensitive to this issue. In Jim’s case, Pedro stands 
in the way of Jim and the ideal outcome, in which no one is shot. Pedro’s power 
and intentions force the unwelcome choice on Jim. However, suppose instead 
that the obstacle is a causally similar non-agent: a trolley, say. This trolley is in 
some state such that it will kill all twenty unless Jim first shoots one, in which 
case the trolley will kill none.14 Williams famously remarked that there is 
something wrong in Act Utilitarianism’s requiring the actor to give up ‘a project 
or attitude round which he has built his life, just because someone else’s projects 
have so structured the causal scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes 
out’.15 But a non-agent could structure the causal scene in the same way, 
presenting the actor with a similar unwelcome choice.16 As Williams’s remark 
suggests, that sort of example wouldn’t serve his purposes equally well, because 
our convictions seem sensitive to the issue of whether the obstacle is presented by 
another agent or not. 
 If it’s true that our convictions are sensitive to this issue, approaches which 
focus on the special responsibility of agents for their own actions may be looking 
in the wrong place. On the face of it, Jim’s responsibility for his own actions does 
not depend on whether he faces Pedro or a causally similar runaway trolley. 
 
 
                                                
14 No agent even set the trolley in motion: assume the wind did so. (I thank Guy Fletcher for 
raising this point.) 
15 Williams (1973: 116). 
16 Scheffler (1982: 10) makes a similar point. 
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2. What Pedro could do 
 
Instead of focusing on Jim, we could focus on Pedro.17 Is there some way in 
which Act Utilitarianism fails to recognise the full significance of the fact that he 
is an agent? 
 Consider again the comparison between Pedro and a trolley. Why would 
the trolley not serve Williams’s purpose just as well? One possible answer is that 
Pedro could respond to Jim in a way he will not. That is, there is a contrast 
between what Pedro could do, and what he would do under any given conditions. 
No equivalent contrast applies to the trolley. 
 At least, this is what commonsense tells us, and what much of ethics takes 
for granted. According to our commonsense use of the concept of ‘could do’, it 
applies to agents in a way that it fails to apply to non-agents. Of course, we use 
the concept for non-agents too. We use it to signal uncertainty about how things 
will turn out, or to make claims about what would happen given certain 
conditions. ‘It could rain tomorrow’ is an example of signalling uncertainty, 
while ‘this car could do one hundred’ is an example of a claim about what would 
happen given certain conditions—in this case, were someone to try to drive the 
car at one hundred miles per hour. Sometimes we might use ‘could’ in a way that 
mixes these functions, as when someone says, ‘that bridge could collapse in a 
flood’. This claim might signal some uncertainty as well as being about what 
would happen were a flood to come. 
 The use we are interested in has nothing to do with uncertainty, so let us 
set that firmly aside. Instead we are interested in the sense of ‘could do’ in which 
we say that agents could perform any one of their options. This seems to be a 
species of the other main use of ‘could do’, in which we use it to make claims 
about what would happen given certain conditions. With respect to agents only, 
                                                
17 Frances Kamm also criticises the focus on the actor in cases like this. However, she advocates 
focusing on victims, rather than on what I’ve called the other agent. She writes of her view (Kamm 
2006: 29): ‘Unlike an agent-focused account, this explanation does not focus on what I do rather 
than what others do. The fact that if I kill someone, I would be acting now and the victim would 
be mine does not play a pivotal role in explaining why I must not kill him even though my duty is 
an agent-relative duty. We explain why I must not kill him by focusing on each person’s 
inviolability. His right, not my agency, constitutes the moral constraint’. Note that her view seems 
to require that there is a right-holder on the scene. For that reason, we might doubt whether it 
explains some intuitions in cases where the harm to be done seems impersonal, as when another 
agent would destroy every artwork in the Uffizi unless I destroy one. 
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we use ‘could do’ to highlight what would happen were the agent to have a 
certain motivation or will. For example, we might say ‘she could train to become 
a doctor’, meaning that this is one of her options. It seems that this means, 
roughly, that were she to have the will to train to be a doctor, she would train to 
be a doctor. This has the same general form as the claim about the car: such and 
such would happen, were such and such conditions met; it’s just that the 
conditions in question centrally involve the agent’s will. Note that there need be 
no question of uncertainty here: we may know for sure that she will not train to 
be a doctor, because we know for sure that she will not have the will to do so. 
The claim instead is that, were she to have the will, she would train to be a 
doctor. Her will is the only relevant obstacle. 
 Thus, this agent-specific use of ‘could do’ asserts the salience of alternative 
courses of action, by implicitly or explicitly emphasising the importance of the 
agent’s will as an enabler or disabler of action in the context at hand.18 It is as if 
we were saying, ‘only the agent’s will stands between her and these possible 
actions’. For example, if I say, ‘I could hold my breath for three minutes’, I am 
claiming falsely that only my decision not to try stands between me and this feat. 
We might contrast Pedro and a trolley using just this sense of ‘could do’. While 
he could respond to Jim’s decision in ways that he would not, the trolley could not 
respond in any way other than it would. It’s not that there is greater uncertainty 
about his response: as Williams constructs the story, we are in no doubt about 
Pedro’s response to each of Jim’s possible choices. Instead, it is that alternate 
possibilities seem salient when we consider Pedro’s response, because only his 
will stands between their possibility and actuality, whilst nothing equivalent 
applies to the trolley. This is one of the main differences we might have in mind if 
we point out that Pedro is an agent but the trolley is not. 
 Should ethical views be sensitive to this particular contrast between agents 
and non-agents? It’s not immediately clear. This is not the only contrast between 
agents and non-agents that we could draw; so it’s not as if being blind to this 
contrast entails treating agents altogether in just the same way as non-agents. We 
need some positive argument for thinking that some mistake is involved in failing 
to discriminate in just this way between Pedro and a causally similar trolley. 
                                                
18 I shall not try to analyse the concept of an agent’s will. I note only that the ubiquitous concept 
of an agent’s options relies on it. 
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 I propose to proceed in two stages. First, let’s see whether caring about the 
contrast between what Pedro could and would do would enable us to say 
attractive things about Jim’s reasons. If, as I shall claim, it does, there is then a 
further question as to whether we can give some rationale for caring about this 
contrast, other than that caring about it has attractive implications. I’ll turn to the 
second question in the following section. 
 First, then, consider how we might try to explain Jim’s reasons in terms of 
what Pedro could do. Act Utilitarianism explains the actor’s reasons in terms of 
the states of affairs that would result from her action, were she to perform it. 
Where these results depend on the behaviour of other agents, it examines the way 
they would behave were the actor to perform the option in question. Now 
suppose that we seek to explain the actor’s reasons in terms of the responses that 
agents in her environment could perform. It’s not immediately clear how to do 
this, for the range of ways those actors could respond may be very wide. 
Moreover, the possible responses may well be inconsistent with each other (as 
when, for example, the other agent could either agree or not agree to the actor’s 
proposal). If we look at the full range of possible responses, we may just have an 
incoherent picture of the value of each of the actor’s options. 
 One way to avoid this incoherence is to try to explain the actor’s reasons 
in terms of the best possible response by other agents. This associates reasons not 
with the full range of things each other agent could do, and not with the way each 
other agent would respond, but with the best way they each could respond. For 
example, we could claim that Jim’s reasons depend on the best way that Pedro 
could respond to each of Jim’s options. If Jim shoots, the best way Pedro could 
respond (by our lights) is to shoot none. The result of this combination of actions 
is one innocent killed. On the other hand, if Jim does not shoot, Pedro’s best 
response is again to shoot none; but the result of this combination of actions is 
none killed. If reasons were associated with the best possible response, in this 
way, Jim would seem to have a strong reason not to shoot. 
 Call this the ‘proto-explanation’ of Jim’s reason not to shoot. It strongly 
resembles the claims made by so-called possibilists in deontic logic.19 Possibilists 
claim that, when considering the deontic status of the actor’s options (whether 
                                                
19 For the debate between ‘actualists’ and ‘possibilists’, see for example: Bergström (1966); 
Jackson and Pargetter (1986); Jackson (1987); Zimmerman (1996: Chapter 6). 
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these options are forbidden, required, or optional), we should consider the actor’s 
own best possible response to each of these options. For example, suppose you 
are asked now whether you will help with some good cause next weekend. Your 
options now are to commit or not; next weekend you will face a choice whether 
to help or not. Suppose also that, as a matter of fact, you would not help next 
weekend even if you commit now, even though it is true that you could help were 
you to have the requisite will. The problem is not what you could do next 
weekend, but what you would do, were you to commit now. It’s not that helping 
would be too onerous, or would require an unreasonable degree of sacrifice; it’s 
just that you would lack motivation to do the best you could do. Let’s say that the 
best outcome would result from your committing-and-helping, the next best 
would result from your not-committing, and the worst would result from your 
committing-and-not-helping. Should you commit?20 
 Actualists say not. They claim that the rightness of actions depends 
exclusively on their ‘actual’ consequences—where that means, somewhat 
idiosyncratically, the consequences they would have were they performed. In our 
case, this means that the rightness of your committing depends on the 
consequences that would result were you to commit, which are worse than the 
consequences that would result were you not to commit. Possibilists, in contrast, 
claim that the rightness of actions can depend on ‘merely possible’ consequences, 
where these would result were the actor herself to respond in ways that she could. 
In particular, they instruct us to look at the consequences of each option 
supposing the actor were to react in the best way she could, even if she would not 
respond in that way. In our example, that means that it is right to commit, since 
doing so would have better consequences than any alternative, on the assumption 
that the actor—you—were to respond in the best way you could, by helping next 
weekend. 
 Our proto-explanation of Jim’s reasons is similar. It evaluates Jim’s 
options according to the results they would have were relevant agents to respond 
in the best way they could. In particular, it evaluates Jim’s option of not shooting 
according to the results it would have were Pedro to respond in the best way he 
could. This option has better consequences (zero deaths) than Jim’s other option, 
                                                
20 This example is adapted from Jackson and Pargetter’s case of Professor Procrastinate. See 
Jackson and Pargetter (1986: 235). See also Jackson (1987: 110, n. 13). 
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which would result in one death even if all relevant agents respond in the best 
way they could. There are, though, two important differences between this and 
the claims that possibilists make. One is that possibilists consider best responses 
only by the actor herself; for all other agents they consider what would occur, just 
as the actualist does. Second, possibilists make claims about what agents ought to 
do, whereas we are considering a claim about Jim’s reasons. What ought to be 
done is downstream of reasons: judgements about what ought to be done are 
verdicts about the interaction of all the reasons there are for or against the actor’s 
options.21 I’ll return to the significance of this point in section 4. 
 Let me summarise the argument so far. For each of Jim’s options, we can 
contrast how Pedro could respond with how he would respond to that option. If 
we focus on the best way Pedro could respond, we have a proto-explanation of 
Jim’s reason not to shoot. This explanation resembles the claims made in deontic 
logic by possibilists, except that it considers the best response by an agent other 
than the actor, and that it involves claims about reasons not obligations. 
 Does the similarity with possibilists’ claims support the proto-explanation 
of Jim’s reason not to shoot? Unfortunately not, for two reasons. The first is that 
possibilists have failed to explain why we should consider the actor’s best possible 
response except to say that doing so has attractive implications in some cases. 
When pressed, they tend to say that failure to consider the actor’s best response 
would let her off the hook too easily, since it releases her from obligations she 
would have were she a morally better person.22 However, that merely reports our 
convictions about cases. It does nothing to explain why reasons should depend on 
‘merely possible’ consequences in the way possibilists claim. The situation is 
comparable to that facing someone who attributes great ethical significance to the 
distinction between doing and allowing. Without some rationale for the 
theoretical claim, we cannot explain the intuitions in terms of the theory; at best, 
the theory would merely summarise the intuitions.23 Moreover, since no one has 
identified a rationale for possibilism, we cannot judge whether any rationale it 
                                                
21 See Dancy (2004: 16 n. 2). For an example of the view that obligatoriness sometimes provides 
an independent reason, and so is not a mere verdict, see Scanlon (1998: 11). 
22 See Zimmerman (1996: 193-5, 203-6). 
23 See Kagan (1989: 13-14); Parfit (2007: 264). 
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might have could extend to cover appeals to the best response by agents other 
than the actor. 
 Second, possibilism seems wrongly to ignore the importance of how 
relevant agents would respond. In our earlier example, it seems wrong to ignore 
the fact that you would not help next weekend, even if you commit now. Surely, 
we might think, that fact must bear on your reasons and the rightness of your 
committing or not. The same point applies to Jim’s case, of course. We seem to 
go wrong if we ignore the fact that Pedro would not respond to Jim’s refusal to 
shoot in the best way he could. This fact about Pedro is amongst the most 
important that Jim must reckon with. Any satisfying ethical view must treat it as 
significant. As I said at the start, we want an ethical view to explain why Jim has 
a strong reason to shoot as well as a strong reason not to do so. 
 For these reasons, the similarity between the proto-explanation and 
possibilism fails to inspire confidence in the proto-explanation. Can we solve 
these two problems? 
 
 
3. Why should we care about what Pedro could do? 
 
The first problem is to find some rationale for caring about what Pedro could do, 
other than that doing so has implications that seem to match common 
convictions in this case. In particular, of course, we’re looking for some rationale 
for caring about the best that Pedro could do in response to Jim’s options. The 
idea is that Pedro’s possible response, of killing none, to Jim’s refusal to shoot, 
may give Jim a reason to refuse to shoot. How could that be? 
 Compare this suggestion with the sort of reasons that Act Utilitarianism 
recognises. According to Act Utilitarianism, the reasons for or against Jim’s 
refusing to shoot have to do with the consequences that refusal would have, as 
compared with the consequences of his other option in the circumstances, 
shooting. The possible outcome in which none are shot just doesn’t feature in this 
analysis. Since there is no uncertainty about Pedro’s response, this possible 
response on his part is utterly irrelevant to Jim’s reasons, according to Act 
Utilitarianism. 
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 Act Utilitarianism has a good explanation of this. It claims that reasons for 
or against an action depend on what that action would cause, in the 
circumstances. It finds reasons in causal relations between actions and valuable or 
disvaluable outcomes. Since Jim’s refusal to shoot has zero chance of causing the 
outcome in which none are shot, in the circumstances—because of the facts about 
how Pedro would respond—this outcome does not bear on Jim’s reasons in this 
case. 
 This explanation points to an intelligible and appealing theoretical claim 
about the grounds of reasons for action: such reasons depend on the causal 
properties of actions, and in particular the good or bad outcomes to which actions 
are causally related. This is attractive, I take it, because actions are interventions 
in the causal order; the whole point of acting, it is tempting to believe, is to 
influence what happens. If so, the claim that causal relations are the grounds of 
reasons for action has some credibility that is independent of any implications it 
may have in particular cases. Possibilism fails to underwrite the proto-explanation 
because it has no equivalent story about the grounds of reasons. If we ask 
possibilists why counterfactual causal relations between actions and valued 
outcomes should give rise to reasons, they have no answer other than that 
supposing they do generates intuitive implications in some cases. 
 However, there is a possible rationale for possibilists’ claims. The key is to 
think of the valued outcomes in question—in our example, the outcome in which 
no one is shot—not as merely possible outcomes of individual actions, but as actual 
outcomes of patterns of action. The outcome in which no one is shot is what would 
occur were Jim and Pedro both not to shoot anyone. This is the actual outcome 
of that pattern of action, in just the sense at issue between actualists and 
possibilists: it is what would happen were the action in question performed. It’s 
just that the action in question now is not an individual action, or indeed any 
action performable by Jim alone. It is a pattern of action, in the minimal sense of 
a conjunction of actions performable by relevant individual agents. There is an 
ordinary causal relationship between this pattern and the valued outcome: if 
performed, the pattern would realise this outcome. 
 So, rather than look for unusual counterfactual causal relations between 
individual actions and the valued outcomes, we might explore the idea that the 
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reasons for or against an action could depend on its being part of some pattern of 
action that is causally related to the valued outcomes. Such reasons would be 
pattern-based: 
 
Pattern-based reasons are reasons for or against some action, A, because of 
the goodness or rightness of some pattern of action, P, of which A is a 
part.24 
 
This is the bare idea of pattern-based reasons. Obviously, it falls short of being a 
theory of such reasons. Most importantly, any theory of pattern-based reasons 
would have to tell us which patterns of action support reasons, and why. That is, 
it would have to tell us about the eligibility of patterns. 
 Nevertheless, even the bare idea should encourage us to take pattern-based 
reasons seriously. For this idea allows us to make sense of the proto-explanation 
of Jim’s reason not to shoot, and more. Why think that the outcome in which no 
one is shot bears on Jim’s reasons for or against refusing to shoot? The answer is 
that his refusal is part of the best pattern of action that he and Pedro could 
perform. On this view, parthood relations are capable of generating reasons, just 
as causal relations are. Jim’s refusal is part of the best pattern he and Pedro could 
perform, and its being part of this pattern gives Jim a reason to perform it. 
 Earlier I said that we can understand Act Utilitarianism as embodying an 
attractive theoretical claim about the grounds of reasons. It embodies the view 
that causal relations ground reasons, and that the point of acting is to affect what 
happens. The idea of pattern-based reasons embodies its own claim about the 
grounds of reasons, which is that parthood relations ground reasons. If that is 
right, we might say that part of the point of acting is to realise parts of favoured 
patterns of action, or to make impossible disfavoured patterns of action by 
refusing to realise one or more of their essential parts. 
 In fact this idea has some currency in ethics. Collective Consequentialism 
is a theory of pattern-based reasons: it claims that you should play your part in 
                                                
24 Here I develop suggestions made by Hurley (1989: Chapter 8); Jackson (1987: 106); and Regan 
(1980). See also Woodard (2003; 2007; 2008). Where P is identical to A we have a limiting case of 
pattern-based reasons. These are, in fact, ordinary act-based reasons, according to which the 
reasons for or against A depend on the rightness or goodness of A itself. In this way, the idea of 
pattern-based reasons is more general than the idea of act-based reasons. 
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the best pattern of action performable by your group, because it is your part in 
this best pattern.25 Some forms of Rule Consequentialism also are best 
understood as theories of pattern-based reasons.26 The idea of complicity seems to 
trade on the suggestion that one should not play one’s part in disfavoured 
patterns, even if doing so is instrumentally neutral or positive when considered as 
an individual action. The Kantian idea of imperfect duties also seems to embody 
commitment to pattern-based reasons. Such duties sort lives, or anyway extended 
portions of lives, rather than individual actions. They say, for example, that a life 
in which one does nothing to develop one’s talents is forbidden for that reason. If 
imperfect duties are ever to give us reasons for or against performing individual 
actions, it must be because such actions are related by parthood to one of these 
forbidden or required lives. 
 Acting with concern for the parthood properties of one’s actions seems 
intelligible. If it makes sense, we can give an independent rationale for the 
suggestion that the outcome in which no one is shot gives Jim a reason to refuse 
to shoot. His refusal is, of course, part of the pattern of action performable by him 
and Pedro that is necessary and sufficient to cause this outcome. If he shoots, he 
makes this outcome impossible. If parthood properties matter, and the pattern 
involving neither Jim nor Pedro shooting anyone is eligible, then Jim has a 
pattern-based reason not to shoot. The plausibility of this explanation depends 
centrally on whether we can give some account of the eligibility of patterns that is 
both plausible and implies that the pattern in which neither Jim nor Pedro shoots 
anyone is eligible to provide Jim with a reason. I shall not attempt to give a full 
account of eligibility here.27 However, it is worth pointing out that to give this 
explanation of Jim’s reason not to shoot we have to deny one possible constraint 
on eligibility that has seemed attractive to many. This constraint is the Willingness 
Requirement: 
 
WR There is a pattern-based reason to play one’s part A in a pattern P 
 performable  by a group G only if the members of G are willing to 
 perform P. 
                                                
25 See Parfit (1987: 30-1); Mulgan (2001: Part Two). 
26 See Woodard (2008). 
27 I discuss issues of eligibility in Woodard (2007: Chapters 4-7). 
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Different versions of this requirement are possible.28 However, they all express a 
simple idea: there are no pattern-based reasons in uncooperative contexts. 
 This idea may seem attractive for various reasons. Note, though, that it 
rules out concern with complicity (since, typically, issues of complicity arise when 
the other agents would not be willing to play their parts in the favoured pattern), 
and it rules out our explanation of Jim’s reason not to shoot, since Pedro is 
unwilling to cooperate in producing the best pattern. 
 Why should someone inclined to accept the existence of pattern-based 
reasons think that they could not exist absent willingness on the part of the other 
agents concerned? There are several possible reasons. One has to do with 
worrying that we won’t be able to find sufficient grounds, other than willingness, 
to exclude clearly irrelevant patterns. Call this the worry about mere 
agglomerations. I shall not say much about this here, except to point out that the 
issue of which patterns are eligible, for someone who believes in pattern-based 
reasons, resembles the issue about which possible actions count as options, which 
is an issue for everyone. There may be resources in that resemblance for 
excluding mere agglomerations on grounds other than facts about willingness.29 
 There is another worry quite separate from that about mere 
agglomerations, however. If we deny the Willingness Requirement, how can we 
give due weight to the importance of facts about how others would respond to the 
actor’s choices? This takes us back to the second problem we identified with the 
possibilist proposal. 
 
 
4. Caring about what Pedro could and would do 
 
The worry is that if we appeal to the idea of pattern-based reasons in 
uncooperative contexts, such as Jim’s, we will fail to be properly concerned with 
how other agents would in fact respond. For example, there might be some merit 
in all UK drivers driving on the right, since this would decrease the risk of 
                                                
28 See Woodard (2007: 71-2). For examples of commitment to this requirement, see Hurley (1989: 
146); Regan (1980: 124). We can apply this requirement to intrapersonal cooperation provided we 
understand ‘group’ such that a group could consist of several selves. 
29 See Woodard (2007: 90-5). 
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accidents when they drive abroad. However, it would be crazy for any individual 
UK driver to drive unilaterally on the right. Why? Because his doing so, together 
with others’ predictable responses, would risk disastrous consequences. Call this 
the worry about recklessness. 
 We should not ignore facts about how others would respond to our 
actions. So, if we believe that facts about how they could respond help determine 
reasons, we’d better find some way of caring about both kinds of fact 
simultaneously. Whatever else Jim does, he’d better care about how Pedro would 
respond to each of his options. If he also cares about how Pedro could best 
respond, that had better not entirely displace the concern with how Pedro would 
respond. 
 Due to the way that the debate between actualists and possibilists is 
framed, we might rush to the assumption that this complex concern is somehow 
incoherent. As I mentioned in section 2, that debate is framed as being about the 
logic of ought statements. That’s unfortunate, because on ordinary assumptions 
ought statements exclude each other. If Jim ought to shoot, it can’t be that he also 
ought to not shoot.30 However, we’ve been talking about reasons, not obligations. 
And on ordinary assumptions, reason statements do not exclude each other in the 
same way. If Jim has a reason to shoot, it could also be that he has a reason to 
not shoot. Reasons can conflict whereas obligations (we usually assume) cannot. 
 If we think of the issue between actualism and possibilism as usually 
framed, then, we may assume that we have to decide between caring about what 
others would do (actualism), or instead caring about what others could do 
(possibilism). But there’s no need to choose one of these alternatives. We could 
care about both. 
 This would be a kind of pluralism, but not about values. It is pluralism 
instead about what we might call the unit of action: the stretch of action whose 
goodness or rightness generates a reason for action.31 According to pluralism of 
                                                
30 Some deny this. They claim that obligations can conflict, so that in some circumstances there is 
no way of avoiding acting wrongly. For example, see Nagel (1979: Chapter 5). However, since 
this is not how we usually think of obligations, framing the issue as one about obligations may 
well obscure the possibility of caring both about how others would respond and about how they 
could respond. 
31 I am indebted to Susan Hurley’s discussion of what she calls the ‘unit of agency issue’ (1989: 
140–48). I have modified her terminology because on my view one can have pattern-based 
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this sort, the goodness or rightness of individual actions can generate reasons to 
perform them, but so too can the goodness or rightness of larger patterns. 
Pluralists believe that the causal properties and the parthood properties of 
individual actions ground reasons.32 
 This is a way of combining concern with how agents would react to the 
actor’s options with concern with how they could react to those options. For 
example, it is a way of combining concern with how Pedro would react to Jim’s 
refusal to shoot with concern with how Pedro could react to that refusal. There’s 
no need to choose between these concerns, provided we descend to the level of 
reasons instead of talking about obligations. 
 Pluralism of this sort is quite distinct from value pluralism, of course. 
Pluralism about the unit of action is a matter of how valued outcomes are 
associated with reasons for action; it isn’t a matter of what has value. However, 
like pluralism about values this sort of pluralism can generate conflicting reasons. 
In Jim’s case, this is just what we want. We set out to find an ethical view that 
could explain his strong reason to shoot as well as his strong countervailing 
reason not to shoot. By embracing pluralism about the unit of action we can do 
just that. His reason to shoot flows from the causal relationship between his 
options and the outcomes that would result. This causal relationship flows 
through Pedro’s response, of course. In this respect, Pedro’s significance is like 
the significance of a causally similar trolley, were that in Jim’s environment. But 
pluralists can add that Jim also has a reason not to shoot, which flows from the 
parthood relationship between Jim’s options and the patterns performable by him 
and Pedro taken together. These patterns include some in which Pedro responds 
to Jim in ways he could but would not. In this respect, Pedro’s significance is 
quite unlike that of a causally similar trolley. 
 In our earlier case, we can say that you have a reason not to commit to 
help, which reflects the facts about how your future self would respond (by failing 
to help next weekend), but also a reason to commit, since that is part of the best 
pattern performable by your present and future selves. 
                                                                                                                                      
reasons without extended forms of agency being either in existence or in prospect. See Woodard 
(2007: Chapter 4). 
32 They might believe, also, that the intrinsic properties of actions can generate reasons. That idea 
has not been at issue here. 
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 Note that pluralism about the unit of action can explain conflicts between 
reasons even where only one good is at stake. This is an attractive implication of 
this sort of view. Utilitarians, for example, could explain regret in this way, in at 
least some cases. Moreover, it is appealing to explain Jim’s conflicting reasons as 
both stemming from the same value: the value of the innocent persons’ lives. His 
reason to shoot and his reason not to shoot seem best captured in this way, since 
their loss dominates this scene. In contrast, views which have to appeal to distinct 
considerations, such as the value of Jim’s own integrity, or which have to index 
judgements of value in some way, seem to get this case wrong. It is a distortion to 
say that Jim’s reasons have these different sources. They both have the same 
source—in the one thing that matters in this case, which is the welfare of the 
hostages. 
 This illustrates a more general point. Often there are several ways we 
could try to explain some complex set of convictions. To some extent, we can 
choose where to distribute the complexity in our explanations. A common view 
amongst consequentialists is that we should try to keep all necessary complexity 
within the theory of value, so that we can keep the structural elements of 
consequentialism—those elements that generate claims about reasons or rightness 
when added to the theory of value—simple.33 But this may sometimes result in 
implausible claims about value, as in Jim’s case. Ideally, I take it, we would like 
an ethical theory with the following features: its structural components are 
plausible in themselves; its value claims are plausible in themselves; and its 
practical implications are plausible in themselves. Though Act 
Consequentialism’s simple structure is plausible in itself, we may not be able to 
maximise overall plausibility by sticking with it. We should be open-minded 
about whether adding complexity in structure is preferable to adding complexity 
in value theory. In particular, we should not fetishise simple structure, if that 
leads us to make implausible claims about value. 
 Pluralism of the sort I’ve described is an attractive structure for cases like 
Jim’s, in which we tend to have the conviction that there are conflicting reasons 
due to the presence in the actor’s environment of some recalcitrant agent. This 
                                                
33 This may involve distinguishing more finely between types of actions, or in some other way 
adding complexity to the theory of value. For careful defence of this general strategy, see 
Portmore (2007). I am grateful to Guy Fletcher and Douglas Portmore for discussion here. 
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recalcitrant agent may be one’s own future self, as in the cases discussed in the 
debate between actualists and possibilists, or it may be a different individual, as 
with Jim and Pedro. In such cases we seem to have a dual concern with the 
recalcitrant agent’s response: how he would respond matters, but how he could 
respond seems to matter too. I’ve explained how both these concerns could 
operate together, reflecting the significance both of the causal relations between 
individual actions and valued outcomes, and of the parthood relations between 
individual actions and favoured patterns of action. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
If we wish to explain both of Jim’s reasons, we should take pluralism about the 
unit of action very seriously. Jim’s reason to shoot plausibly reflects the 
importance of what Pedro would do, while Jim’s reason not to shoot plausibly 
reflects the importance of what Pedro could do. This sort of explanation seems to 
have at least as much promise as the main competitors, which focus on what Jim 
does. 
 There are hard problems facing the sort of pluralism I’ve described. To get 
a full-fledged theory, one would need to specify what makes patterns eligible to 
support reasons in a way that is both plausible and avoids endorsing the 
Willingness Requirement. To be plausible, this account should answer the worry 
about mere agglomerations, and enable us to answer the worry about 
recklessness.34 Supposing we could do all that, we’d also want to know something 
about how the reasons associated with different units of action interact with each 
other—just as we’d like to know how the reasons associated with different values 
interact with each other. 
 One of the advantages of this sort of view is that it explains why a causally 
similar trolley would not have served Williams’s purposes just as well. Were Jim 
faced with a trolley that would kill none if he shoots one, or kill twenty if he 
refuses to shoot, we would find it less troubling to say that he should shoot. His 
reasons in this case seem different to those in the case involving Pedro. However, 
                                                
34 I attempt these tasks elsewhere (Woodard 2007: Chapters 5-6). 
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the way the trolley would respond to each of Jim’s choices is, in relevant respects, 
just the same as the way that Pedro would respond. Moreover, any special 
relationship that exists between Jim and his own actions or point of view is 
constant across these two cases. So, views that focus on what Jim does seem ill 
equipped to explain our different reactions to the two cases. 
 A critic might object as follows. The fact that Pedro is an agent surfaces 
within the response he would make to Jim’s choices. We do not need to look any 
further, or to consider what Pedro could do. The important difference between 
Pedro and the trolley is that, if Jim refuses to shoot the trolley would kill twenty, 
while in the other case Pedro would murder twenty. Pedro’s agency triggers the 
application of different moral concepts, which enables us to distinguish between 
the cases even if we are concerned only with how Pedro would respond, and not 
at all with how he could respond. 
 That is true. However, consider a final case. Suppose Jim faces Frankfurt 
Pedro. If Jim shoots, Frankfurt Pedro will shoot none. If Jim refuses, Frankfurt 
Pedro will shoot twenty. Not only that, but since he is a responsible agent, 
Frankfurt Pedro would murder twenty. However, he could not respond in any 
other way to Jim’s refusal—because a counterfactual intervention mechanism 
would prevent him if he tried to do so.35 
 If the critic is right, we should have the same convictions about Jim’s 
choice when faced with Frankfurt Pedro as we do about Jim’s choice when faced 
with Ordinary Pedro. In both cases, Pedro would not merely kill twenty were Jim 
to refuse to shoot; he would murder them. But Jim’s reasons seem responsive to 
the fact that Frankfurt Pedro could not do otherwise. While Frankfurt Pedro is 
certainly not exactly like a runaway trolley, he is more similar to such a trolley 
than is Ordinary Pedro. If, as I suppose, we think that Jim’s reasons reflect the 
difference between these cases in any degree, that is evidence that we care not 
only about what Pedro would do, but also about what he could do. 
 
                                                
35 See Frankfurt (1969) and Hurley (2003: 16–20 and Chapter 2). Of course there is controversy 
about whether Frankfurt-type cases really show that responsibility does not require that the agent 
concerned could have done otherwise. If they do not it is harder for me to respond to the objection 
at hand. But even so, we should be able to distinguish between concern with the contrast between 
murder and other kinds of killing, on one hand, and concern with the contrast between how other 
agents would respond and how they could respond, on the other. 
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